Using financial contracts to facilitate informal leases within a Western
United States water market based on prior appropriation
Abstract
The ability to reallocate water to higher-value uses during drought is
an increasingly important ‘soft-path’ tool for managing water resources
in an uncertain future. In most of the Western United States,
state-level water market institutions that enable reallocation also
impose substantial transaction costs on market participants related to
regulatory approval and litigation. These transaction costs can be
prohibitive for many participants in terms of both costs and lengthy
approval periods, limiting transfers and reducing allocation efficiency,
particularly during drought crises periods. This manuscript describes a
mechanism to reduce transaction costs by adapting an existing form of
informal leases to facilitate quicker and less expensive transfers among
market participants. Instead of navigating the formal approval process
to lease a water right, informal leases are financial contracts for
conservation that enable more junior holders of existing rights to
divert water during drought, thereby allowing the formal transfer
approval process to be bypassed. The informal leasing approach is tested
in the Upper Colorado River Basin (UCRB), where drought and
institutional barriers to transfers lead to frequent shortages for urban
rights holders along Colorado’s Front Range. Informal leases are
facilitated via option contracts that include adaptive triggers and that
define volumes of additional, compensatory, releases designed to
mitigate impacts to instream flows and third parties. Results suggest
that more rapid reallocation of water via informal leases could have
resulted in up to $222 million in additional benefits for urban rights
holders during the historical period 1950 – 2013.