

## Uncertain Pathways to a Future Safe Climate

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### Abstract

Global climate change is often thought of as a steady and approximately predictable physical response to increasing forcings, which then requires commensurate adaptation. But adaptation has practical, cultural and biological limits, and climate change may pose unanticipated global hazards, sudden changes or other surprises, as may societal adaptation and mitigation responses. We outline a strategy for better accommodating these challenges by making climate science more integrative, in order to identify and quantify known and novel physical risks even—or especially—when they are highly uncertain, and to explore risks and opportunities associated with mitigation and adaptation responses by engaging across disciplines. This improves the chances of

50 anticipating potential surprises and identifying and communicating “safe landing” pathways that  
51 meet UN Sustainable Development Goals and guide humanity toward a better future.

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53

## 54 **Introduction**

55 A common metaphor for global warming is that rather than causing disasters directly, it “loads the  
56 dice,” changing the probability of high-impact weather events such as extreme rains, droughts and  
57 storm surges (NAS, 2016). But increasingly events occur that appear unprecedented, even  
58 previously considered virtually impossible—we are playing with a new set of dice. Australian  
59 bushfires more intense than any since European settlement and Canadian ones setting new  
60 burned-area records, severe long-term flooding following extreme monsoon rainfall in Pakistan,  
61 and temperatures in western Canada reaching 49°C have produced shocking headlines. Can  
62 climate science anticipate such extraordinary events and their consequences? In some cases it  
63 has: for example unprecedented heat waves and heavy rains have been predicted (e.g., Fischer et  
64 al. 2021) and are now evident on several continents. However, consequences such as record-  
65 breaking fires and floods and their associated fatality and damage tolls have come as surprises. It  
66 is unclear how multiple changes can be navigated, or where adaptation will reach limits such as  
67 those already attained for coral atoll communities (IPCC 2019).

68 Climate and environmental change may bring global-scale changes that have not been previously  
69 experienced. While the geologic record reveals possibilities such as rapid ice sheet loss or different  
70 ocean overturning regimes, some changes are hard to anticipate. The emergence of the “ozone  
71 hole” in the 1980’s, for example, was completely unexpected even though scientists had foreseen  
72 gradual thinning of the ozone layer by CFC gases (Solomon 1999). Moreover if bromine-based  
73 compounds had been used and escaped into the atmosphere rather than chlorine-based ones, the  
74 consequences for humanity would have been cataclysmic (Crutzen 1996). It would be naive to  
75 assume that greenhouse gas buildup to levels unprecedented in at least 2.7 million years, and  
76 warming unprecedented in at least the last 2000 years (IPCC, 2021) and probably much longer,  
77 could not also bring unexpected challenges.

78 One concern is climate “tipping points” or regime shifts where regional or global systems could  
79 change rapidly and perhaps irreversibly on human timescales (Solomon et al., 2009) to an  
80 unfamiliar state if the global temperature crosses some threshold (Armstrong McKay et al. 2022).  
81 These include dieback of the Amazon or other forests (Wang et al., 2023), shutdown of the Atlantic  
82 thermohaline circulation, changes in ocean chemistry that affect marine life (e.g., Heinze et al.,  
83 2021), ice shelf collapse or ice sheet melt, and many other possibilities. Concern about tipping  
84 points among the science community has been increasing since the first Intergovernmental Panel  
85 on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report (Lenton et al. 2019), and some were explicitly  
86 addressed in the Summary for Policymakers of the 2021 report (IPCC 2021). These alarming  
87 possibilities embody a broader problem: how can society be sure that it is adequately prepared, not  
88 just for what is expected, but for “*low-likelihood, high-impact*” (LoHi) possibilities a warming planet  
89 might throw at us? This requires realistically identifying and assessing risk in order to develop a  
90 resilient mitigation and adaptation strategy.

91 Adding to the challenge, climate change is not happening in isolation but is part of a broader  
92 spectrum of human influences on the environment. In addition to climate change, native forests  
93 are affected by deforestation and fires; groundwater by irrigation and other water use; coastal  
94 erosion by development; ice retreat by air pollutants that darken the ice surface; disease  
95 propagation by human travel; and species extinctions—at a geologically dizzying rate—by habitat  
96 destruction (IPBES 2019). Future changes in human well-being, as encapsulated by the United

97 Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), will depend not only on climate but on many  
98 other stressors and on how (or whether) human and natural systems can adapt to the new climate.  
99 These changes will have widely varying impacts across diverse communities around the globe,  
100 and efforts to mitigate one problem will rebound on other problems. Issues of equity and multi-  
101 dimensional approaches to vulnerability were highlighted in the decades of loss and damage  
102 negotiations leading to COP27 in 2022 (Gerrard and Wannier 2013).

103 Is climate science up to the challenge of preparing decision makers at all levels for this uncertain  
104 future? Science has made steady progress but there are important aspects overlooked by the  
105 traditional approaches. This paper discusses two overarching and challenging questions that  
106 climate science must now strive to answer. First: *what potential high-impact climate hazards,*  
107 *surprises or irreversible changes should society be genuinely worried about and how can the*  
108 *associated risks be usefully quantified and communicated?* And second: *what do achievable,*  
109 *internally consistent and safe pathways to a future climate look like that also meet broader human*  
110 *needs, and how can we identify them?* These questions are interrelated, and answering them will  
111 require the climate science community to work across disciplines to identify risks arising within the  
112 entire earth/human system, and to connect with all aspects of society. To spur progress in  
113 answering these questions, in 2021 the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) launched  
114 the “Safe Landing Climates” Lighthouse Activity, one of several new activities designed to facilitate  
115 cross-cutting climate research that better informs society about climate risk.

## 117 **An Interdisciplinary Challenge**

118  
119 These concerns are not new. Economists have long noted for example that the upper tail on the  
120 probability distribution of climate sensitivity dominates risk rather than the central value, due to the  
121 highly nonlinear increase of damages with warming (Weitzman 2009, 2012, Nordhaus 2011,  
122 Ackerman and Stanton 2012). Observers and climate scientists have more recently highlighted  
123 “missing risks” of climate change that are poorly understood and hard to quantify; the importance  
124 of including them somehow in economic evaluations and decision making processes (Simpson et  
125 al. 2021, Calel et al. 2020, Rising et al. 2022); and the need for a risk-based framing for climate  
126 change (Sutton 2019). Frameworks such as “planetary boundaries” (Rockström 2009) have been  
127 proposed to cope with the multiple problem dimensions and needs (including for multiple  
128 communities) encapsulated in UN SDGs, particularly those relating to water and food security and  
129 protection of biodiversity, yet still struggle with the inter-relatedness of individual boundaries.  
130 “Storylines” of possible futures are a simple hence useful way of dealing with deep uncertainty  
131 (Shepherd et al., 2018), and expert elicitation can make progress on problems that are hard to  
132 quantify (Dessai et al. 2018). Yet in spite of these tools and awareness, assessment of climate risk  
133 has been limited by a focus on incomplete modelling tools and “linear thinking” rather than thinking  
134 more broadly about rare events and possibly nonlinear and cascading consequences.

135  
136 Tipping points are one example of where science needs to focus. A recent assessment (Armstrong  
137 McKay et al. 2022) gives global tipping temperatures for a range of systems, identifying 1.5 °C  
138 above preindustrial as a potential trigger for multiple tipping points, but a look behind the best  
139 estimates reveals wide ranges and considerable uncertainty, as also illustrated in the “burning  
140 embers” diagrams of IPCC (IPCC, 2022). It has been suggested that multiple system transitions  
141 could interact leading to “tipping cascades” (Wunderling et al. 2021; Fig. 1) although the idea is not  
142 well tested. While risk-analysis frameworks ideally start with hazard probabilities and damages,  
143 climate science currently struggles to quantify either of these in a useful way, except for frequently  
144 occurring examples like annual-maximum precipitation (e.g., Kim et al. 2020). While this is helpful,  
145 the greatest risk typically comes from very rare, unprecedented or compound events (Kotz et al.

146 2022; Zscheischler et al., 2018). The most recent IPCC report, while acknowledging a few high-  
147 profile tail risks, still focuses on likely outcomes, and frames them as deviations from today's  
148 climate while thresholds might be crossed that lead to very different impacts. Meanwhile impacts  
149 can be hard to quantify based on today's observations even for relatively frequent events, as future  
150 adaptation responses may affect limits (see IPCC, 2022).

151  
152 Most of these science gaps involve coupling between physical climate and subsystems such as  
153 vegetation, ocean biochemistry, ice sheets, or human responses that are typically treated  
154 individually or coupled only rudimentarily in present modelling tools. A sobering example of the  
155 problem is the US "Dust Bowl" of the 1930's, where rapid land cover change contributed to  
156 unprecedented temperature extremes; these lay well outside the envelope of retrospective climate-  
157 model predictions (Fig. 2) because models lacked land-use feedbacks and realistic land cover  
158 forcing. The extreme temperatures likely caused physical teleconnections to the rest of the  
159 northern hemisphere climate (Meehl et al. 2022) and led to mass human migration; similar coupling  
160 has affected Lake Chad (Franzke et al. 2022) and may lead to human conflicts (IMCCS 2021).  
161 Model ensembles struggle to explain other climate variations such as the mid-Holocene "green  
162 Sahara" (e.g., Hopcroft and Valdes 2021) and increases during recent decades in Pacific trade  
163 winds and surface temperature gradients (Kajtar et al. 2018). It is not clear that all such problems  
164 result from coupling, as models also still inadequately represent processes such as mixing, clouds  
165 and convection. These affect LoHi's such as extreme climate sensitivity or atmosphere/ocean  
166 circulation shifts (Bjordal et al. 2020, Carlson and Caballero 2016), while inadequate model  
167 coupling compromises representation of possible tipping of Boreal and tropical forests (see Wang  
168 et al., 2023) including bushfire risk, rapid ice sheet change leading to rapid rises in global sea level,  
169 regional flood risk, and others. In general, multi-model ensembles therefore cannot be relied upon  
170 to fully characterise uncertainty as often assumed, especially for unprecedented situations or  
171 changes that involve strong coupling between Earth system components.

172 Human responses are an even more challenging modelling problem. They can exhibit tipping  
173 behaviours apparently analogous to those in physical systems (Winkelmann et al. 2022), and can  
174 provide positive or negative feedbacks on climate change through adaptation behaviour. Modelling  
175 of these interactions remains in its infancy even compared to Earth System Models, but studies are  
176 beginning to project global-mean economy-climate interactions (e.g., Moore et al. 2022,  
177 Ramanathan et al. 2022).

178 Current endeavours to identify future impacts and to generate possible future societal pathways  
179 are largely independent, even though strong coupling is expected among impacts, mitigations, and  
180 adaptations for climate change and other UN SDGs. For example, scenarios for IPCC reports  
181 begin with quantitative assumptions about future trends in populations, economies and  
182 technologies, while these may be influenced by climate change. In IPCC (2021), the Shared  
183 Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs, Riahi 2017) were defined by five narratives about future global  
184 directions concerning energy use, population, etc., and were loosely constrained to fit with  
185 outcomes corresponding to five global temperature increases by 2100. These temperature  
186 increases were in turn set by a backward-looking analysis based on the concept of a carbon  
187 budget (IPCC 2021 and earlier) of allowable GHG emissions for a given warming target. The fact  
188 that the uncertainties associated with the underlying, detailed assumptions were not well quantified  
189 made it impossible to properly assess the risks associated with each scenario, or to assess how  
190 self-consistent the various assumptions were. These elements need to be better integrated to  
191 capture or at least bound possible feedbacks and uncertainties.

192 Understanding limits to biophysical and societal adaptation is crucial in assessing whether a given  
193 climate trajectory is safe or dangerous. Climate damage calculations are usually extrapolated

194 empirically from the impact of natural climate variations. In some domains, such as agriculture, the  
195 apparent negative impacts of rising temperatures would be muted by adaptations on longer time  
196 scales, for example growing different crops (White et al. 2011). But in other domains, for example  
197 human heat stress, adaptations implicit in the empirical data would eventually reach biophysical  
198 limits and fail with sufficient warming (Sherwood and Huber 2010) leading to a dramatic escalation  
199 of impacts. Plants (Bokszczanin and Fragkostefanakis 2013), wildlife (Ratnayake et al., 2019) and  
200 marine species can all reach temperature or carbon-dioxide tolerance limits (Heinze et al. 2021).  
201 This requires more attention to accurately calibrated variables rather than just anomalies from the  
202 current or preindustrial state, and going beyond “likely” changes to consider plausible alternatives.

203 Indeed humanity is grappling with how to remain within multiple “planetary boundaries” for multiple  
204 communities, limiting climate change while meeting the societal and biodiversity needs  
205 encapsulated in the UN SDGs. This becomes harder as more boundaries enter the picture (Lade  
206 et al. 2020) and assessment of plausible pathways puts climate alongside the other UN SDGs  
207 (Pörtner et al. 2021). As humans are influencing the Earth system in so many ways, adaptations  
208 and mitigations interact, requiring a holistic view. If, for example, a climate mitigation strategy such  
209 as biofuel development leads to increased pressure on a land or water resource, unintended  
210 consequences may affect the ability to mitigate climate change or reach other UN SDGs.  
211 Adaptations may, on the other hand, produce co-benefits such as improvements in biodiversity  
212 while expanding green space.

213

## 214 **A Strategy for Integrative Climate Science**

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216 We now present a strategic program of more integrative climate science to address these  
217 challenges. Many of these approaches, even if not new, are not yet widely adopted; we argue that  
218 expanding them would lead to greater progress toward answering the questions posed in the  
219 Introduction and improve the decision-relevance of climate science.

220

### 221 ***Safe Landing Pathways Exploration***

222

223 Identifying safe trajectories requires a highly interdisciplinary and whole-of-system approach to  
224 explore the effect of interacting mitigations and adaptations (Zommers et al. 2020), accounting for  
225 climate risk along the entire trajectory particularly for nonlinearities and tipping points. Treating  
226 such quantitative aspects requires stochastic thinking (Sutton 2019) so that future scenarios  
227 consider tail risks and a full range of possible events such as tipping point crossings, temporary  
228 disruptions by large volcanic eruptions (Sharkov 2020), natural climate variations, societal  
229 responses, and responses of the biosphere (Natali et al. 2021). This involves a far greater range of  
230 possible futures than the handful of SSP and RCP pathways considered by the IPCC, and  
231 associated risks to the SDGs such as food and water supply.

232 One particular science need is to better understand the human perturbation of the global carbon  
233 cycle. There is for example an opportunity to reassess the Transient Climate Response to  
234 Emissions (TCRE) by combining multiple lines of evidence similar to a recent effort for the  
235 “Charney” sensitivity (Sherwood et al. 2020), consolidating past research on understanding the  
236 land and ocean carbon fluxes and pools, and how they respond to observed and future rises in  
237 atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> and changing climate (e.g. Turetsky et al. 2020, Canadell et al. 2021). Direct  
238 interventions such as large-scale afforestation or other biologically based carbon dioxide removal  
239 options, however, may pose new challenges to safe pathways for food, water, and biodiversity, and  
240 expose gaps in current research.

241 Recent ambitious goals of the UNFCCC framework such as the Net Zero objective or the  
242 Global Methane Pledge now open the possibility of declines in CH<sub>4</sub> and CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations well  
243 before the end of the century. The unique impacts that such forcing reversals would have on the  
244 Earth system need to be investigated. In particular better quantification of the key relevant carbon  
245 turnover times, both in the ocean and land continuum, will be key to assess the response of the  
246 carbon cycle to zero or even negative emissions (McDougall et al 2022). Understanding of  
247 potential hysteresis and irreversibility or potential transition from carbon sinks to sources under  
248 such conditions is largely uncharted territory. This requires growing a research emphasis on high-  
249 mitigation pathways and what the consequences would be on the carbon cycle, climate response,  
250 SDGs and associated impacts.

251 Current strong-mitigation scenarios such as the SSP1-1.9 (Riahi et al. 2017) assume substantial  
252 capture and sequestration of carbon, primarily on land, with bioenergy with carbon capture and  
253 storage (BECCS) being one of the most heralded options. Typical Earth System Model (ESM)  
254 simulations such as those performed under CMIP6 (Eyring et al 2016), simply assume “external”  
255 negative emissions without representing in the model the biogeochemical processes responsible  
256 for them or their impact on land resources (Fig. 3). Potential trade-offs and limitations to land-  
257 based or ocean-based mitigation now need to be considered, moving to comprehensive ESMs that  
258 include interactions among climate system, land and ocean biogeochemical cycles, and other  
259 biological processes (discussed further below). Better understanding of carbon cycle interactions  
260 with food resources, water availability, and biodiversity, in the context of a changing climate with  
261 increased risks of climatic (e.g., droughts) or ecologic (e.g., wildfires) extremes, is crucial if carbon  
262 dioxide removal is to come anywhere near fulfilling current hopes on future mitigation pathways.

263 Similarly, future methane concentrations will be determined not by emissions alone but by the  
264 overall Earth system response to climate change. The recent rapid increase in atmospheric  
265 methane could be due to increased anthropogenic emissions or a change in natural emissions and  
266 sinks (McNorton et al. 2018). This requires improved understanding of how the removal processes  
267 respond to different rainfall patterns, soil moisture, and temperatures. The impact of future  
268 atmospheric composition changes, including for example those from a hydrogen economy (Ocko  
269 and Hamburg 2022), on the oxidising capacity of the atmosphere and hence methane lifetimes  
270 must be considered.

271 The complexity of the system demands new types of integrative and exploratory models and new  
272 types of data (Figs. 3,4). Paleoclimate data can provide valuable constraints on biological  
273 responses to climate where direct human impacts are absent (Salvatecchi et al. 2022) but are not  
274 completely analogous to our current situation. If we are to understand the societal actions  
275 necessary to remain within planetary boundaries from the viewpoint of all UN SDGs, some degree  
276 of modelling of the physical-human interface or at least exploration of possible interaction  
277 scenarios is needed (Moore et al. 2022, Ramanathan et al. 2022), discussed further below. Going  
278 very far down this path takes modelling into a realm where its verification becomes even more  
279 challenging, so the goal must be the illumination of possible hazards, cascades, and trade-offs  
280 rather than reliable prediction. In addition to capturing more interactions, this type of modelling  
281 becomes inherently more relevant to decision makers, who are trying to anticipate all types of  
282 important hazards, synergies, or efficiencies in an uncertain and complex environment. A clearer  
283 picture is needed of impacts as adaptation limits are approached and how they depend on other  
284 factors (e.g., for heat stress, the availability of water and power), to help anticipate failures of  
285 coping mechanisms.

286 Various modern industries and academics have turned to analytical “games” to simulate  
287 hypothetical yet plausible future scenarios (Bontoux et al. 2020; Bartels 2020). Gaming exercises  
288 in complex scenario planning can illuminate the intricacies and feedbacks that lead to unexpected

289 outcomes, and the decision (or tipping) points that led to them—potentially helping to avoid  
290 adverse scenarios. Such activities involving sectoral experts would throw light on the issues and  
291 times at which a dynamic adaptation of policy pathways (DAPP, Haasnoot, 2013) is needed. The  
292 development and implementation of regularly scheduled climate “pathways” gaming workshops  
293 could allow for frequent assessments of ever-evolving possible pathways on decadal and century  
294 timescales. A successful approach must be inclusive of scientific expertise, stakeholders, industry  
295 partners, community groups and policymakers to include input on recent geopolitical, societal,  
296 technological, and sustainable advances. The results of these exercises could inform new and  
297 nimble scenarios for climate modelling efforts, international and local policies, and communication  
298 of climate risks, and could provide an understanding of the range of plausible and timely pathways  
299 to safe landing climates.

300

### 301 ***Signposts of Change for Adaptation***

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303 Adaptation is a crucial element of these future pathways, but adaptation responses are complex  
304 and can be hard to foresee. Societal adaptation planning has proven challenging in part because it  
305 requires proactive decision-making on uncertain futures, and in part because it hinges on local  
306 cultural understanding. Cultural factors can inhibit what might otherwise seem like obvious  
307 strategies, for example relocation. This is prevalent among indigenous cultures who, while they  
308 might embrace an understanding of the impermanence of particular conditions at a location, still  
309 value their connection to the location (Lambert et al. 2021). This favours in situ adaptation (or  
310 possibly, failure to adapt) rather than relocation. Such issues are also debated in developed  
311 countries, for example in Australia where some mayors have suggested relocating entire towns  
312 due to flood risk from heavy precipitation, but this idea understandably encounters resistance. The  
313 expense and difficulty of proactive adaptations, superimposed on the possibility that worst-case  
314 outcomes may not be realised, can be strong disincentives to engage any kind of anticipatory  
315 response even if it yields the “safest landing.”

316 How can the science community assess risk and calibrate responses in a way that is 1)  
317 geographically aware, 2) can be incorporated into a flexible management strategy (such as DAPP;  
318 Haasnoot et al. 2013), and 3) recognises the risk of compound and cascading threats? We  
319 propose that a key strategy be the development of a suite of geographically-aware sentinel signals  
320 (“signposts” Hermans et al. 2017) of changes in threat drivers that would foreshadow the need to  
321 alter a regional planning pathway, particularly when exceedance of a relevant tipping point in some  
322 global process essentially rules out lower projections. In concept, regional adaptation plans can be  
323 made for multiple projections, with a strategy for moving from one plan to the next as a particular  
324 projection becomes more likely. By anchoring adaptation plans to such signposts of physical  
325 change, we can simultaneously guide adaptations to better manage the greatest risks, while also  
326 making adaptation more predictable so that it can be incorporated into projected future global  
327 pathways.

328 Sea level rise offers one clear opportunity to apply this approach. The phenomenon is highly  
329 heterogeneous globally: increased rates of ice sheet melting contribute unequally to sea level  
330 acceleration across the globe (Kopp et al. 2015), and slowing of the AMOC is connected to shifts in  
331 the Gulf Stream (Ceasar et al. 2018) that specifically affect sea level in the Mid-Atlantic region of  
332 the United States. Therefore the risk of rapid sea level rise in that region, over a multidecadal  
333 planning horizon, is strongly influenced by tipping point indicators associated with the Atlantic  
334 circulation as well as ice sheets, and will not be picked up in time by only monitoring sea level itself  
335 (Wenzel and Schroter 2010, Houston 2021). A regionally targeted “signposts” approach would  
336 escalate local responses based on specific changes in remote drivers, for example Atlantic

337 meridional overturning, Antarctic sea ice (Purich and Doddridge 2023), Antarctic surface  
338 temperature, and Antarctic ice shelf integrity (Orr et al., 2023). This can mitigate the difficulties that  
339 communities often face to coalesce around similar perspectives of the future (Sallenger et al. 2012,  
340 Mitrovica et al., 2009, Jackson et al., 2015), and can allow regionally differentiated adaptations to  
341 be both better supported by evidence and more predictable.

342 Complications in selecting adaptation scenarios are exacerbated by significant uncertainty in global  
343 projections (IWR 2011), which in the case of sea level rise is mainly due to uncertainty about  
344 change in the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets (Edwards et al. 2021; DeConto et al. 2021;  
345 Fig. 4). This points to a need for improved global modelling, while the heterogeneity of impacts and  
346 desire to identify quantitative signposts calls for the complementary development of global and  
347 regional models that resolve the relevant processes and enable risk assessment (Scambos et al.,  
348 2017). These should ideally include compounding stressors such as changes in weather systems  
349 and resulting storm surges. On the other hand a signpost-like approach can mitigate against  
350 modelling limitations by identifying observable indicators of risk. Concerning a flood-prone region  
351 for example, different-than-expected increases in the most extreme rainfall events collectively  
352 across other regions may become evident long before a signal clearly emerges in that particular  
353 region itself; these would inform the local risk because prediction uncertainty arising from  
354 atmospheric model process errors is correlated geographically (Bador et al. 2018). For both of  
355 these examples, however, better observations (of tropical rainfall and polar ice processes) would  
356 be needed to fully exploit them.

357 To incorporate cultural understanding into the adaptation planning, a more holistic and thoughtful  
358 perspective is needed that includes and respects local and indigenous knowledge, women and  
359 youth, and develops long-term relationships between the community and development partners.  
360 Flexible, multi-pathway planning has been recognised as critical to balancing investment with long-  
361 term resilience under uncertainty (e.g., Wilby & Dessai 2010, Dewulf, & Termeer 2015,  
362 Zevenbergen et al. 2018). Conversations between scientists and stakeholders, focused on  
363 signposts as a connection point, can identify realistic adaptations and situations where adaptations  
364 may be impractical or unacceptable.

### 365 366 ***Characterising Low-Likelihood, High-Impact (LoHi) Risks***

367  
368 The discussion so far indicates that the traditional approach of considering (and presenting in  
369 reports like those of the IPCC) only anomalies and likely ranges (see Fig. 2) needs to be  
370 supplemented by a risk-oriented framework that focuses on lower likelihood, high impact  
371 possibilities, extreme events, and exceedance of absolute adaptation thresholds. For example,  
372 exceeding extreme heat thresholds (e.g., Freychet et al., 2022, Henry, 2022) due to any  
373 combination of the above factors would lead to dramatically greater impact on humans, the  
374 biosphere and/or crops.

375 Given that climate risk is strongly influenced (if not dominated) by LoHi possibilities, how do we  
376 anticipate and characterise these scientifically when, by definition, they involve events for which  
377 there will be few if any direct past analogues? There are a few options. The first is to draw on  
378 relevant cases from prior observations and paleoclimate archives to better understand possible  
379 events and their consequences, and then evaluate how these would change in a warmer world.  
380 Events could include record-breaking observed extremes and rapid changes (involving the  
381 cryosphere and ocean) in paleo records, though not limited to these. The second is to improve  
382 modelling tools to be able to better represent LoHi events, including tipping points, irreversible  
383 events and event cascades; this is part of an overall modelling strategy discussed in the next  
384 subsection. The third is to change the way we use existing models and analyse Earth system data

385 (simulated and observed), to focus more on climate risk and to break it down onto hazard and  
386 probability components for estimating what events are possible, their probabilities, impacts,  
387 reversibility, and interaction with pathways to a mitigated climate.

388 Observed case studies of the most severe events from instrumental or paleoclimate proxy data can  
389 challenge models and show storylines of how the most extreme events unfold. This applies  
390 particularly to past cases that have taken society and the scientific community by surprise, such as  
391 the record-shattering 2021 Pacific heatwave (McKinnon and Simpson 2022; Thompson et al.,  
392 2023) and other recent drought and extreme heat events. These have been followed by severe  
393 wildfires across continents in the Western US, Australia, the Mediterranean, Siberia, and most  
394 recently Canada. Wildfire seasons and ranges have extended on every fire-prone continent and  
395 intense fires appear to be damaging even fire-adapted ecosystems (e.g., Williams et al. 2019)  
396 suggesting a rapidly growing risk. Fire and drought can lead to substantial changes in carbon  
397 uptake or release (Humphrey et al., 2021), affect air quality over wide regions, and when  
398 compounded heat and drought events can lead to failures of multiple breadbaskets (Zscheischler  
399 et al. 2018) potentially affecting the global food supply (Korngruber et al. 2018; see also Meehl et  
400 al., 2023). Although worsening heat and stronger evaporation exacerbating drought are features of  
401 global warming (IPCC 2021), paleo records show the potential for very severe drought in the last  
402 millennium (Cook et al., 2007). These records are crucial for testing our understanding and  
403 modelling of regional rare climate extremes and tipping points (Braconnot et al. 2019, Hopcroft and  
404 Valdes 2021), and show changes that might have contributed to civilisation collapse such as the  
405 end of the Indus ~4.2 kyr BP (e.g. Staubwasser et al. 2003). The same arguments apply to risks  
406 from rising sea level and severe rainfall, where recent events have led to surprisingly severe  
407 consequences such as the Ahrtal floods of 2022 in Germany. We need to learn how the most  
408 severe events unfold physically, even if future events will not be identical to them. In practice this  
409 can be done using analogue methods or process studies (see Yiou et al., 2014; e.g. Cowan et al.,  
410 2020b), and benefits from storyline approaches to specific events (Shepherd et al., 2018).  
411 Ensemble boosting methods (Leach et al. 2022, Gessner 2022) and the UNSEEN method  
412 (Thompson et al., 2017) can simulate feasible events similar to, but more severe than those which  
413 occurred in reality or in a conventional simulation.

414 To generalise, we can use the model types and observations currently available but analyse them  
415 in a more risk-facing way, focusing on thresholds, near-term irreversibility and the potential for  
416 impacts to cascade. The design of the next modelling exercise (CMIP7 and beyond) is an  
417 opportunity to go further to explore the potential for breaching tipping points within the coupled  
418 Earth system using more complete models.

419 To get a better handle on LoHi events, we advocate a “what-if” strategy: first identify potentially  
420 important event scenarios, then address their associated risks by separating the objectives of  
421 estimating their probability vs. estimating their consequences. These two objectives can be met  
422 with different modelling setups or observations; for example, consequences can be estimated by  
423 imposing a scenario in an ensemble of ESM simulations (e.g., Amazon dieback in LUMIP) to build  
424 a more complete picture, including for different scenario variants. Some tipping points, for example,  
425 might have only modest impacts and so may not figure strongly in risk. Separate approaches  
426 (perhaps combining model and long or paleo datasets) may be able to estimate scenario  
427 probability (or plausibility). This strategy can be widely applied; for example in the expert elicitation  
428 case of Dessai et al. (2018), impacts were expressed conditional on (unknown) changes in  
429 moisture advection into a the study region, the probabilities of which could in turn be estimated  
430 given other global-change scenarios. This approach of separating impact from probability could  
431 also be useful for some compound events and event cascades, where the conditional probability of

432 one event given another can be estimated, although uncertainties inflate when estimating chains of  
433 events.

434 Quantifying HiLo probabilities has been a serious challenge. For example although some individual  
435 studies proposed quantitative probabilities for extreme sea level rise this century (DeConto et al.  
436 2021, Bamber et al. 2021) this has not yet been attempted by WGI, who from AR4-AR6 tried  
437 various other strategies to convey uncertainty (e.g. via caveats) and tail risks as relevant to  
438 different stakeholders (Kopp 2023). Quantifying a PDF of climate sensitivity was likewise  
439 contentious in assessments, but was eventually done with broad community support (Sherwood et  
440 al. 2020). Even if challenging, a rough idea of the informed probability of HiLO events would be  
441 extremely useful even if this involves transparently subjective judgments, since even careful and  
442 well-intentioned qualitative explanations often end up misinterpreted or their caveats overlooked  
443 (Kopp 2023). Interdisciplinary work across all IPCC working groups is needed to address HiLO  
444 challenges.

445

### 446 ***More Complete Earth-System Modelling Approaches***

447

448 While imperfect model skill is a well-known issue affecting all of climate science, the challenges  
449 discussed here also call for new modelling approaches to tackle three additional needs. First,  
450 current modelling approaches need the scope (i.e., coupling) to assess large-scale irreversible  
451 change, proximity to tipping points, and other unprecedented events that involve multiple Earth  
452 system components. For example, to address possibilities such as Amazon dieback or continued  
453 growth of fire hazards, Earth system models would need to interactively and realistically simulate  
454 fire and its emissions, vegetation loss and regrowth, crop impacts, and vegetation change under  
455 changing climate conditions in addition to carbon emissions (see Fig. 3). Many climate models  
456 have suitable land surface and fire models, yet interactions among climate, vegetation, carbon  
457 cycle and fire are either absent, limited in scope or not well tested in current ESMs. Human actions  
458 such as deforestation play a significant role as well. Fully exploring these issues with models will  
459 require advances in model coupling, and in understanding the role of societal choices and  
460 pressures that drive deforestation. Similarly, to address future sea level rise requires dynamic ice-  
461 sheet models that can be tested on past climates, but modellers are only beginning to simulate the  
462 last deglaciation dynamically (e.g. Quiquet et al. 2021). At the same time these more  
463 comprehensive models must still represent extreme weather events, which significantly contribute  
464 to economic risk (see e.g. Chen et al., 2021, Calel et al. 2020).

465 The second need is long runs and/or large ensembles, in order to assess tail risks, especially the  
466 most extreme and rare (hence consequential) hazards or cascading events. While ensemble sizes  
467 of ESM runs are growing, they remain far from being able to capture the more extreme events,  
468 although new methods such as ensemble boosting may help (see above). Analogously, large  
469 model design ensembles such as CMIP remain as valuable as ever, but only to the extent that the  
470 models are physically independent.

471 Third, we need innovative ways of coupling the physical and human systems that capture weather  
472 and climate impacts currently missing in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). Many questions  
473 about pathways require this, for example how adaptation actions will be affected by climate  
474 change. Human responses can exhibit tipping behaviours apparently analogous to those in  
475 physical systems (Winkelmann et al. 2022) but so far this is only illustrated with toy models. An  
476 obvious limitation is that much human behaviour is challenging if not unfeasible to model  
477 quantitatively. Efforts to couple tipping points into economic models (e.g. Lontzek et al. 2015) are  
478 useful but need better information on tipping point likelihoods, consequences and interactions.

479 These needs for holism and large ensembles for risk assessment are in tension with the current  
480 push for large-scale, ultra high-resolution (km-scale) atmosphere/ocean models, for example with  
481 “digital twin” initiatives (Bauer et al. 2021). Such models are clearly of scientific value due to their  
482 ability to simulate a great range of scale interactions in the atmosphere and ocean, which may  
483 address long-standing biases and uncertainties, for example in circulation variability and change  
484 (Palmer et al., 2022; Slingo et al., 2022). However, these high resolution models are too unwieldy  
485 to be used for broad exploration of pathways or climate transitions (Stainforth and Calel 2021), to  
486 include and resolve earth system feedbacks on their relevant timescales, or for more than a small  
487 number of them to be developed. They therefore need to be complemented by simpler, faster  
488 models that can for example accommodate feedbacks from the cryosphere or biosphere within  
489 many possible climate trajectories.

490 There are at least two ways to enable such holism in practice. First, advanced computing and  
491 artificial intelligence /machine learning approaches can be used to link different types of model  
492 together, or build emulators of one that can efficiently run within the other. This strategy is already  
493 being explored to expand the range of spatial scales effectively represented in numerical  
494 atmosphere models (Rasp et al. 2018) but could be used more broadly to emulate IAMs within  
495 ESMs, for example, or build efficient hybrid models of such a coupled system that could more  
496 quickly identify potentially important feedback behaviour, where extreme events are represented by  
497 emulators. Such models (especially the latter) may lack reliability but could be used to explore  
498 possible risks that could then be explored further, as a strategy to anticipate possible surprises.

499 One challenge in coupling models, already experienced with atmosphere-ocean coupled models, is  
500 that this often amplifies biases (e.g. Cohen-Solal and Le Treut 1999), such as the Amazon rainfall  
501 dry bias (e.g. Monteverde et al, 2022) or the eastern equatorial Atlantic warm bias (e.g. Exarchou  
502 et al. 2018). These biases are a problem for regional rainfall simulation, for nonlinear or threshold  
503 impacts like heat stress, and for coupling to dynamic vegetation or ice sheets which are sensitive  
504 to absolute temperatures. Innovative ways of correcting or compensating model biases rather than  
505 usual tuning approaches (Dommenget and Rezny 2018) could mitigate these problems. Overall,  
506 novel process diagnostics need to be deployed in atmosphere-ocean models and also ESMs that  
507 are more relevant to climate change (Eyring et al. 2019).

508 The other way to enable holism is to recognise limits of predictability and work within them. No  
509 matter how resources are expended, some climate uncertainties are likely to be irreducible,  
510 analogous to the chaos-imposed limit on weather forecasting. To be effective, rather than wait for  
511 models that can predict everything we must establish strategies to assess and communicate that  
512 which is known, expected, and possible given current knowledge (Lemos and Rood 2010). It is  
513 also important to recognise which uncertainties actually affect decisions: for example detailed  
514 regional climate simulations may not be helpful if the key uncertainty comes down to whether or  
515 not some tipping point is crossed that isn't represented in that modelling system. This synergises  
516 with “pathways” options discussed earlier, where the focus shifts from deterministic prediction to  
517 probabilistic, or beyond this to identifying plausibilities (Shepherd et al., 2018). Co-design of  
518 pathways between scientists, social scientists, users/practitioners, facilitated by communication  
519 expertise is essential.

520

## 521 **Communication**

522

523 Achieving many of the goals above will be impossible without better communication between  
524 disciplines. This may require long-term, interactive in-person collaboration to educate physical and  
525 social scientists about one-anothers' conceptual approaches, methods, and terminology. It may be  
526 valuable to develop educational resources targeted at this application. We also need to learn how

527 scientific understanding can be best used to inform effective decision making, recognizing that  
528 models are but one source of information and guidance. These goals will require ongoing iteration  
529 between the physical science community and climate information users, as well as the  
530 development of a community of science practitioners who can apply scientific knowledge to thorny  
531 complex problems. The communication of climate information to stakeholders, via e.g., climate  
532 services, is still underdeveloped (e.g., Hansen et al. 2019).

533 Communicating climate risk to the public, meanwhile, is as important as ever. Uncertainty has  
534 always complicated this already-difficult task; our strategies may offer help. Climate games that  
535 can be used for research can also be used for education and outreach. Communicating plausible  
536 and timely pathways to a safe landing climate is crucial for better decision making at the nation,  
537 city, and individual level. Policy changes, no matter how well supported by objective reasoning or  
538 science, will not be enacted without public support. It is now clear that the “information deficit  
539 model”—that providing sufficient information about climate change will lead to understanding and  
540 support for appropriate action—is not sufficient (Centre for Public Impact 2021). Concrete  
541 scenarios are more easily grasped than abstractions. We aim to illustrate realistic possible  
542 pathways and their implications as well as possible, acknowledging the uncertainties, to inform  
543 debate on solutions.

544 Communication needs to distinguish between genuinely unlikely and more probable events. Some  
545 challenging high-impact possibilities are not even LoHi’s because they are increasingly likely. New  
546 signs are emerging that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) is becoming unstable (Gudmundsson  
547 et al. 2019), so its eventual collapse (perhaps centuries from now) is not unlikely. Likewise, tree  
548 mortality is accelerating in the Amazon rainforest (Hubau et al. 2020) and observed hydrological  
549 changes suggest a few areas could be approaching collapse (Fig. 5; Saatchi et al. 2021). Some  
550 transitions (e.g., collapse of WAIS) are low-likelihood in the near term, but become probable with  
551 more warming. Because, like most LoHi’s, these high-impact events have no historical analogue, it  
552 is challenging to tally their costs or get people to appreciate and act on the risks, both for  
553 interdisciplinary as well as public communication. Record-breaking weather and climate extremes  
554 also fit in this category. The lack of experienced analogues is why some citizens don’t respond to  
555 warnings about extreme events, mirroring the global-scale readiness problem for anything  
556 unprecedented (e.g., Baron and Petersen 2015), while others may respond with climate doom-ism  
557 which is not helpful either.

558 When communicating extreme climate risk including that of tipping points, it is therefore important  
559 to provide a sense of perspective, emphasising how a combination of mitigation and adaptation  
560 can help to navigate climate risk, and how positive tipping may accelerate the transition (e.g.,  
561 Tabara et al., 2018). The study of pathways that incorporate both hazards and responses,  
562 preferably in an interactive and adaptable way, are able to support gaming and communications  
563 platforms that convey this sense of agency.

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## 564 565 **Conclusion** 566

567 We propose a strategy that pivots physical climate science toward addressing pressing needs by  
568 answering questions about, first, global climate-related risks (including low-likelihood, high-impact  
569 events) and how to communicate them, and second, possible self-consistent pathways (good or  
570 bad) that lay before us. This strategy involves a stronger focus on worst-case outcomes and limits  
571 to adaptation that must be avoided, but also aims to identify and hence avoid maladaptation  
572 scenarios that could unintentionally upset climate or other Sustainable Development Goals. More  
573 serious global risks need to be separated from less serious ones by an evidence-based approach.

574 Pathway exploration, risk framing and deep uncertainty are natural to decision makers and can  
575 serve both science and communication purposes, and help social science and physical sciences  
576 communities communicate.

577 This requires climate science to become more integrative. First by considering a richer and more  
578 flexible family of future pathways using exploratory techniques like gaming and expert elicitation,  
579 and making use of adaptation frameworks such as signposts that mark socially significant  
580 thresholds of change and help us continually update assessments of where affected communities  
581 stand and what can still be achieved. It can also address a diverse class of high-risk events or  
582 event combinations or cascades, potentially using conditioning variables or storylines to break the  
583 problem into manageable pieces that can be attacked with different tools. Existing tools can be  
584 used to address some interactions between climate, ice, vegetation and permafrost for example,  
585 and to focus on thresholds such as heat tolerance. There is however a need for more integrative  
586 models that explore the physical, biological and social systems, and their interactions, more  
587 holistically, even though this is challenging. New technologies like machine learning could help to  
588 link existing components across scales and spheres. But we must also make better use of  
589 observations, particularly of extreme outcomes and rare events including paleoclimate data, and  
590 standard model types for example via model experiment setups or analysis techniques designed to  
591 illuminate less-likely but important events. In the face of deep uncertainty we must strive to  
592 distinguish what is already known (and should be more clearly communicated), what can be  
593 known, and what is probably unknowable on a relevant time scale.

594 Delivering on this strategy will require working across the IPCC Working Groups and disciplinary  
595 entities such as the WCRP Core Projects. It will require examining how physical climate changes  
596 interact with mitigation strategies and adaptations such as geoengineering, land-use changes,  
597 migration, and others, and do so fully interactively instead of using a pipeline approach from  
598 physical change to impact and mitigation. The authors invite the scientific and broader  
599 communities to help.

600

## 601 **AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

602 No new software or data were generated for this article.

603

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
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
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
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**Figure 1. Transition thresholds for important geophysical system transitions remain highly uncertain. (A) Warming thresholds estimated for a few isolated tipping point transitions. (B) If the two systems interact strongly (higher values of interaction strength), a collapse of the WAIS may increase the threshold for Greenland while a collapse of Greenland could reduce that for the WAIS. (C) The threat of uncertain tipping point occurrence and damage (solid line) increases benefits of early mitigation (dashed line). Panels (a,b) from Wunderling et al. (2021), (c) from Cai and Lontzek (2019).**



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**Figure 2. Dust bowl extreme temperature anomalies exceeded worst model hindcasts. 90% range of CMIP5 model historical simulations shown by light shading, observed values shown by dark red/blue shading. The extreme high values are likely due to land surface changes not represented in the models. Adapted from Cowan et al. (2020).**





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918 **Figure 3: System interconnections for the example problem of land-cover change. Thick arrows show**  
 919 **interactions that are considered by physical climate scientists so far, yet may not be fully coupled**  
 920 **(e.g. land cover response to climate); thin arrows show additional interactions that may be crucial in**  
 921 **governing final outcomes for society, and will require broadening the scope of modelling as well as**  
 922 **novel ways of addressing deep uncertainty.**

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927 **Figure 4. Projected loss of West Antarctic Ice Sheet is sensitive to coupled processes. Substantial**  
 928 **loss of the WAIS and consequent sea level contribution of well over a metre within two centuries is**  
 929 **projected by one model if global warming exceeds 3C when atmosphere-ocean coupled warming is**  
 930 **accounted for (top row and bottom panel; blue colour at top denotes ice thickness). This is not**  
 931 **predicted if only ocean warming of the ice shelf is accounted for (middle panel). Adapted from**  
 932 **Scambos et al. (2017). Quantifying this threshold and ice loss rates is crucial for coastal**  
 933 **communities.**

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



Figure 4. Maps of vulnerability of humid tropical gross primary productivity (GPP) and evapotranspiration (ET).  
Source: Saatchi et al., 2021.

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936 **Figure 5. Many tropical land biomes are already under existential threat from climate change and**  
 937 **land use. (top) stress regimes as determined by variance analysis of observables from 1980-2020.**  
 938 **Increases in persistent co-variability of stressors such as land-use or climate changes and**  
 939 **responses such as primary productivity (middle panel) and evapotranspiration (bottom panel)**  
 940 **suggest instability and an approaching transition to a new biome (shown by brown areas). From**  
 941 **Saatchi et al. (2021).**