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\begin{document}

\title{Trust and transboundary groundwater cooperation}



\author[1]{Gopal Penny}%
\author[1]{Michèle Müller-Itten}%
\author[2]{Gabriel de los Cobos}%
\author[1]{Connor Mullen}%
\author[1]{Marc Francois Müller}%
\affil[1]{University of Notre Dame}%
\affil[2]{GESDEC (Geology, Soils and Waste), Department of Environment, Transport and Agriculture, State of Geneva}%


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  \date{May 23, 2024}


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\begin{abstract}
International transboundary aquifers provide important water supplies to
over 150 countries. Long-term sustainability of these aquifers requires
transboundary cooperation and yet only a select few (1\%) transboundary
aquifers are formally regulated by a treaty. To better understand the
drivers and incentives that allow treaties to emerge, we develop a
two-player game to model the social dilemma of transboundary aquifer
cooperation. The game incorporates socio-economic and hydrogeological
features of the system and highlights the importance of trust to
evaluate the benefits and risks of any treaty. We validate the game
through a case study of the Genevese aquifer, which is governed by the
longest-running and most collaborative transboundary aquifer treaty on
record. We then focus on the symmetric game between identical players to
explore the role of groundwater connectivity, alternative water supply,
water demand, and trust on the emergence of transboundary treaties. The
solution space highlights how incentives for cooperation are greatest
when the value of water is commensurate with the cost of groundwater
abstraction. Cooperation requires high trust in situations characterized
by water abundance or scarcity. The model further indicates how two
different types of agreements are likely to emerge. Treaties that limit
abstraction have greater potential when countries have access to an
alternative water source, whereas treaties that restrict pumping near
the border have greater potential in water-scarce regions with emerging
concerns over groundwater depletion. In addition to helping explain the
emergence of existing treaties, this framework offers potential to
identify aquifers that may be amenable to cooperation.%
\end{abstract}%



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