Acknowledgments:

It has been previously hypothesised that nest predation is higher at forest edges. This has important conservation implications for the increasingly fragmented U.K. climax community. I aimed to test the generality of this edge effect in a mixed deciduous forest fragment which borders open grassland. Artificial nests containing a combination of quail and plasticine eggs were used, at ground and arboreal levels. I found an overall edge effect on nest predation rates, however this effect was not specifically seen in ground nests. Ground nests experienced significantly higher levels of predation than arboreal nests. I suggest this edge effect is due in part to the steep productivity gradient over the ecotone.

Review: Optimized FRET pairs and quantification approaches to detect the activation of Aurora kinase A at mitosis.In this manuscript, Bertolin et al. improve on their original Aurora Kinase A biosensor to produce a second generation that would help follow AURKA activation in regions where it is extremely low in concentration and undetectable with the original AURKA biosensor. The authors develop two independent strategies to improve on their previous work. First, they develop a single-color AURKA biosensor for multiplex FRET and second, a method to observe and quantify FRET efficiency in areas with very low AURKA abundance. The authors show that dark acceptors ShadowG and ShadowY allow for single-color FRET/FLIM measurements while first generation tandem GFP isn’t suitable due to low concentration of AURKA. They also show the inability of the original construct to measure FRET by 2c-FCCS and thus develop a novel method by replacing the donor-acceptor pair with a mTurquoise2 and novel superYFP. The experiments allowed the authors to develop guidelines when making new FRET biosensors such as characterizing the nature of the protein and making sure the conformational changes of the protein fall within the Forster’s radius of the donor-acceptor pair.The improvements to AURKA biosensors represent a novel way for studying the function of this kinase. While fluorescence anisotropy has been used in the past to study FRET in different kinases such as PKA, ERK, and cAMP, it has not been known to work with AURKA due to the nature of the protein and it’s function. Also, given the fact that levels of AURKA is regulated throughout the cell cycle, the ability to detect it at low levels will help understand it’s function in diverse contexts.The authors provide good explanations with regards to the anomalies seen in their data and point out any results that deviate from their expected hypothesis. However, experiments with regards to characterizing the effects of inserting a novel superYFP on the cell and AURKA’s function need to be seen. The author’s also fail to provide clear explanations for discrepancies between the inactivated kinases in Fig. 1B and 1C. The author’s work is systematic, giving context when constructing new strains, and provides clear explanations when talking about new methods of quantifying FRET. One thing that I did have a hard time understanding was the use of anisotropy to measure FRET, and I think the authors could have done a better job introducing the concept.In terms of experiments that need to be done in order to further validate the results. As mentioned previously, the differences observed in Δlifetime for inactivated ShG-AURKA-mTurq2 and ShY-AURKA-mTurq2 need to be investigated or explained better. Similarly, effects of inserting flanking donor-acceptor pairs on the function of the kinase need to be quantified. It would be relevant to see how insertion of the flanking pairs affect AURKA localization to the spindle poles and morphology of the cell compared to wildtype. It would also be interesting to see if normal, non-arrested cells can function properly for multiple generations with the inserted constructs.There are minor spelling mistakes that can be attributed to continental differences. But for the most part, the article is easy to read and well written, however, explaining the thresholds in Fig. 1 and 2 will help the readers. As someone who is not familiar with analyzing fluorescence data, I did have a tough time understanding Fig. 3 and 4C, but the data and the author’s interpretation are clear and convincing.

Quantum chemistry must evolve if it wants to fully leverage the benefits of the internet age, where the world wide web offers a vast tapestry of tools that enable users to communicate and interact with complex data at the speed and convenience of a button press. The Open Chemistry project has developed an open source framework that offers an end-to-end solution for producing, sharing, and visualizing quantum chemical data interactively on the web using an array of modern tools and approaches. These tools build on some of the best open source community projects such as Jupyter for interactive online notebooks, coupled with 3D accelerated visualization, state-of-the-art computational chemistry codes including NWChem and Psi4 and emerging machine learning and data mining tools such as ChemML and ANI. They offer flexible formats to import and export data, along with approaches to compare computational and experimental data.

In einem erst kürzlich veröffentlichten systematischen Review zur Effektivität nicht-pharmakologischer Interventionen zur Reduktion der Delirinzidenz bei erwachsenen Intensivpatienten kommen die Autoren in ihrer Analyse u.a. zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine Lichttherapie mit hoher Beleuchtungsstärke im Vergleich zu einer Standardbeleuchtung keinen signifikanten Effekt auf die Delirinzidenz hatte (N = 829, gepoolte Daten) \cite{Bannon_2018}. In einer Korrespondenz hierzu weisen Shen et al. auf einige wichtige Aspekte der inkludierten klinischen Studien hin, die mit ein Grund dafür sein könnten, warum eine klinische Wirksamkeit der Lichttherapie auf die Delirinzidenz nicht festgestellt werden konnte \cite{Shen_2019}.  Als einer der wesentlichen Gründe wird die Studienheterogenität in Bezug auf die verwendete Methodik angeführt. In der größten Studie hierzu mit insgesamt 714 Patienten wurden mit maximal 1.700 Lux \cite{Simons_2016} deutlich niedrigere Bestrahlungsstärken verwendet im Vergleich zu den anderen im Review berücksichtigten Studien die bis zu 5.000 Lux verwendeten. Darüber hinaus ist ebenfalls zu berücksichtigen, dass der Großteil der Patienten in dieser Studie zum Zeitpunkt der Intervention sediert war. Das bedeutet, dass das Licht in diesen Fällen nicht direkt auf die Retina fallen konnte. Genau hiervon ist aber die biologische Wirksamkeit des Lichtes abhängig. Zudem haben Untersuchungen an der Charité Berlin gezeigt, dass die Applikation von Licht mit hohen Bestrahlungsstärken auf einer kleinen Leuchtfläche, wie beispielsweise in der Studie von Simons et al. verwendet, zu einer Überschreitung der absoluten Blendentoleranz von 10.000 Candela führen \cite{Luetz_2016}. Derartige Lichtinterventionen werden von den Patienten nicht toleriert und bergen mutmaßlich ein Risiko für die Entwicklung von Delirien.Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass wir ganz am Anfang der Dosisfindung für eine wirksame Lichttherapie bei Intensivpatienten stehen. Voraussetzung ist und bleibt aber der wache Intensivpatient,  da die erwünschte Wirkung nur über den Lichteinfall auf die Retina erzielt werden kann.

Advanced Genetics recognizes that the assessment of conceptual advance and potential utility and interest are subjective.  The journal’s editors therefore keep the following questions in mind when assessing a submitted manuscript and then provide specific explanation how these considerations apply to the selection of this particular manuscript.Initial Editorial AssessmentAvailable to authors of all manuscripts. Open if the article is publishedScopeDo the research, methods or topics fit within the aims of this, or another journal? Conceptual advanceWhat is already known in this area and related fields?What gap in knowledge motivates this research?How do the main claims of this study relate to benchmark prior publications?Is this field new, growing or mature?What new insight is offered by the current submission?If confirmatory, or a negative finding, what is the value added?Potential InterestAre many labs likely to conduct their research differently because of these findings?Is the paper likely attract readers beyond the immediate research community of the study?Can the main conclusion be generalized to other areas of genetics and genomics? Strength of conclusionWhat evidence and methods support the main claim of the study?Are the experimental and analytical approaches aligned with the current community standards?What are the technical issues with key datasets and workflows, what reviewer expertise is needed?Are the authors skeptical, are alternative interpretations ruled out?Is there clear separation of hypothesis generation and testing?Are conclusions replicated or supported by multiple lines of evidence? Reviewer instructions: All reviewer comments are read by the authors and editors, and are open if the article is publishedArticle types with data and analysis:Summarize the main claims in the context of prior publicationsIdentify the strengths and weaknesses in evidence, design and methodsPlease number each of your comments to the author, starting with the most importantAre all data, analysis and methods usefully available as declared in accordance with relevant community standards?Are there any ethical concerns about human or animal research subjects, perceived conflicts or attribution?How should the editor interpret your comments in making a decision?Declare your own conflicts of interest, or no conflict of interestPerspective (literature review) article type:Which of the main concepts and advances in the field has the author fairly represented?Will this Perspective lead a large number of researchers to conduct their research differently?Are the claims, evidence and recommendations presented in a clear and logical order?Declare your own conflicts of interest, or no conflict of interestAre all of the display items compelling or needed? 

This is a preprint review of  Doc2b Ca2+-binding site mutants act as a gain of function at rest and loss of function during neuronal activity by Quentin Bourgeois-Jaarsma, Matthijs Verhage and Alexander J Groffen. The preprint was originally posted on bioRxiv on January 31, 2019 (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1101/536581). In this manuscript, Bourgeois-Jaarsma and colleagues work on identifying the role of the Ca2+-binding double C2 protein, Doc2b, in neurotransmission. They focus on two Doc2b mutants (Doc2bDN and Doc2b6A) and observe that the two mutant proteins 1) localize at plasma membrane of neurons less activity-independently than wildtype Doc2b, and 2) show different Ca2+-dependent pattern from wildtype Doc2b when binding with phospholipid in vitro. They also show that in cultured neurons (either wild type or Doc-KO), overexpression of the two mutants 3) both increases the frequency of spontaneous neurotransmitter release at rest, 4) introduces different patterns of response overtime when repetitively stimulated, but 5) doesn’t affect the neurons’ morphology. From these, they conclude that the two mutants share similar behaviors both at rest and during neuronal activity: increased spontaneous activity at rest and decreased activity during neuronal activity, and thus showing Doc2b plays an important role in Ca2+-dependent phospholipid association.In general, the logic of this study is clear, and the authors present their work in a way easy to follow. After visualizing subcellular localization of the mutants, the authors then test their Ca2+-dependency in phospholipid binding, effects of overexpression of them in neurons at rest, during activity and on morphology. Also, different models, strategies and experiments are used to address questions and hypothesis at each step. The combination of in vitro Ca2+ binding experiment, in vivo subcellular localization and physiology recording really makes the story coherent and intriguing to think deeply about. Moreover, the authors consider various possibilities and carefully design their controls.However, one of the weaknesses would be the conclusion that overexpression of the mutant Doc2b proteins would lead to an increased short-term depression. The authors somehow tend to over-normalize the data in some cases and make the interpretations not convincing enough.

Interval Sieve Algorithm Creating a Countable Set of Real Numbers from a Closed Interval © 2019 by Ron Ragusa      All rights reserved

Worksheet - ResultsWhich “Dirty Water” source did you select?     ______________________________________What filtration items did you select? (circle your choices)RocksSandCheeseclothTissueCoffee FilterNettingCotton BallsActive Charcoal

Worksheet - Debrief

Fifth Generation (5G) network represents a new generation network able to transmit data with a speed higher than 1 gigabit per second and with much lower latency – the time that it takes to move data back and forth. 5G network will be about 20 times faster than the current 4G networks, and latency could be as low as 1 ms compared to 50 ms for the 4G networks \cite{Liu_2016}.  Accordingly, fifth generation (5G) networks will enhance the productivity of are critical to the infrastructure.    5G Network Market LeadershipHuawei is the major global supplier of effective but low-cost wireless equipment.  It is now the world’s biggest telecommunication equipment maker, with a 28 per cent market share and a pioneer in 5G network market.  Its closest rivals are Ericsson and Nokia, the European companies.  In US, the big four carriers – Verizon, AT&T, Mobile and Sprint – are beginning developing 5G networks.   To maintain its market leadership and to increase its autonomy in 5G market, Huawei has released a series of 5G based chipsets designed to compete with U.S. and Korean competitors. These chipsets cover most of the telecom field: Kirin 980 chipset for smartphones; Balong 5000 chipset for modems; Tiangong 5G base station; and Kunpeng 920 chipset for the Taishan cloud server \cite{2019a}. Of course, Huawei is facing serious impediments in the US.  Setting this aside, we can compute Huawei’s market share in the 5G network market.   Quantifying Market Share AdvantageThere is extensive research that has established the following two empirical facts \cite{Kalyanaram_1995}.  1.      One, the pioneer/first-mover enjoys a sustained market share advantage.  Early entrants to a market enjoy a sustained market share advantage \cite{Kalyanaram_2013} .2.      Two, this advantage can be quantified.  In a two-players market, the market share advantage of the pioneer is 58 percent (vs 42 percent for the second entrant).  In a four-players market, the market shares are 36, 25, 21 and 18 percent respectively for the first, second, third and fourth entrants. In a five-players market, the respective market shares of the entrants are 31, 22, 18, 16, and 13 percent \cite{Robinson_1994} . Applying these well-established facts, Huawei’s market share can be forecast to be about 31 percent, even four other viable competitors – Ericsson, Nokia, Verizon, and AT&T – emerge.  This has serious implications to commerce, economy and society, because the applications of 5G networks are pervasive.  Therefore, Huawei now stands as a potential significant global contributor to increased economic growth and productivity through its enabling technologies. Applications of 5G NetworksIn general, virtual and augmented reality experience and implementation will be richer, personalized and more complete.Reordering monetary worldOne of the important developments that is likely to dramatically alter our society, commerce and economy, and polity is the conceptualization, design and increasing rise of crypto-currencies and block chains in economy and commerce. With a clever application of cryptography, we will be able to secure the transfer of money and payment without needing a trusted third party.  No central banks, no clearing houses.  Per most technology and policy experts , the role of traditional currency will diminish in the next decade or two and even disappear \cite{2018}.  Obviously, this will change the optics and substance of commerce and conduct. Experts are already discussing regulatory mechanisms for the new world order \cite{2018a}.  The crypto-currency and block-chain efficiencies and effectiveness will depend much on the speed of the networks, and the 5G networks will be crucial in this context. Accordingly, Huawei will have a big role to play in the design of new global economic and market ecology and order.Remaking the medical world5G will make an enormous difference in providing health care to millions of people in remote locations, as well as training doctors in surgical specialties \cite{Borgstrom_2011}.  Telecom equipment maker Ericsson is already working with doctors at King's College in London to test 5G-compatible prototypes of touch-sensitive gloves connected to robots. Reimagining mobility and transportation5G will accelerate the adoption of self-driving cars and vehicle-to-vehicle communication — where cars exchange their location, speed, acceleration, and direction.The vehicles will know before their drivers do when a truck five vehicles ahead suddenly brakes or another car turns into your blind spot .  These changes will evidently recast mobility and safety.  As with land vehicles, technology will enable communication between drones, and enhance their precision and safety. The US ConcernsWith such ubiquitous application of 5G technology, and Huawei’s leadership in 5G market place, the US administration must weigh the concerns about security \cite{2019} with the enormous benefits that Huawei participation is likely to bring and the injury that Huawei’s ban is likely to cause. What are the likely adverse consequences of ban on Huawei?  The rural America is likely to suffer in productivity and prosperity.  We may unwittingly create a urban-rural digital and prosperity divide.  The roll-out of 5G networks is likely to be delayed, and the quality may suffer without direct competitive pressure.  Most importantly, continued future innovations will suffer.  The question, therefore, is this: Can US protect its national security interests, and yet permit Huawei’s participation?   The answer is Yes, the US can.  If Europeans can do it , why not the US which is the most innovative society in the world?

Suggested time: 50 minutesGrade: 3-5

If we take the Laurent expansion of the Riemann zeta function about s = 1 $$ \zeta(s) = {s-1} + ^\infty {n!}\gamma_n (s-1)^n $$ which defines γn, the Stieltjes constants, where γ₀ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Next perform a series reversion on this to give a series $$ \chi(s) = 1+{s}+^\infty {s^n} $$ which has expansion \chi(s) = 1 + {s} + {s^2} + {s^3} + {2s^4} + \cdots The coefficients κ(n) seem to decrease quite steadily, even up n being a few hundred, where the γn get large. n (n) ---- --------------- -- 0 1.000000000 1 1.000000000 2 0.5772156649 3 0.4059937693 4 0.3135616752 5 0.2556464523 6 0.2159181431 7 0.1869526867 8 0.1648872027 9 0.1475121704 10 0.1334717457 11 0.1218874671 12 0.1121649723 13 0.1038876396 14 0.09675470803 15 0.09054358346 : The first 16 coefficients of the inverse function. Letting $$ R_n=^n i_k $$ and $$ P_n=^n ki_k $$ and {i}n = {i₁, i₂, ⋯|P = n − 1}, I have observed the expression for κ(n) from series reversion to be $$ \kappa(n)=} (-1)^n\left[^{R-1}j-n\right]\left[^n {i_k!}\left({k!}\right)^{i_{k+1}}\right]\gamma_0^{i_1} $$ where we define κ(0)=1. Two examples $$ \kappa(3) = \gamma_0^2 - \gamma_1 = - \left[^{i_1+i_2+i_3-1} (j-n)\right]{1!}\right)^{i_2}\left({2!}\right)^{i_3}}{i_1!i_2!}\gamma_0^{i_1} $$ $$ \kappa(4) = \gamma_0^3 - 3 \gamma_0\gamma_1 + {2} = \left[^{i_1+i_2+i_3+i_4-1} (j-n)\right]{1!}\right)^{i_2}\left({2!}\right)^{i_3}\left({3!}\right)^{i_4}}{i_1!i_2!i_3!}\gamma_0^{i_1} $$ We can conjecture that $$ \kappa(n+1) < \kappa(n), \;\;\; n\in^{>0}? $$ Is this perhaps a more well behaved way to look at the Stieltjes constants?

In this article we explore a new family originating from Brownian motions, the branching brownian motion.

Suggested class time: 50 MinutesOverview:In this lesson, our class will be divided into small groups to learn about the necessities of living things and needs for survival. We will achieve this by demonstrating all 4 categories of STEM learning. First, we will research the needs of a specific creature (Technology) teaching about habitat, diet, shelter & climate. We will then learn how our creature has learned to adapt to his specific climate (Science) we will build a habitat for our little friend with basic crafting supplies (Engineering) Then the final stage of our project, we will compare our life boxes with other groups to learn how different each creature is and compare their differences, discussing opposites, similarities, shapes & temperatures (Math). At the end of our lesson, we will talk about why it's important to take care of our planet to keep our living things happy.Vocabulary:ClimateHabitateTemperatureOppositesSimilaritiesShelterDiet AdaptationPollutionGoals:Students learn about the necessities of living thingsStudents are able to collaborate in order to solve problemsUnderstanding of differencesLearning about other climates Students will show teamworkStudents learn how to use technology for researchMaterials Needed For This Project:Access to computer or library to research different animalsCardstock paper, a shoebox or something suitable for a 'habitat' structureConstruction paper/felt scraps for creating foliage, food, shelter, etcScissorsGlue and/or tapeAssorted small animal figurines of varies species (We used a turtle, a butterfly, an elephant, a tiger & a seahorse)Crayons or colored pencilsPre-Lesson:Explain to the class that different creatures need different things to survive (i.e. a fish cannot live on land, a lion cannot live in a tree, etc) And then explain how different parts of the world have different animals. Explain climate, habitat, diets and how animals learn to adapt to their surroundings.Next, divide the classroom up into small groups and assign different responsibilities for each person. For example, one child might be in charge of diet, while the other is responsible for shelter or habitat. Groups sizes will depend on the size of the class, we used 4 kids per group.The teacher will randomly hand out one creature to each group. This alleviates any disagreements on which one to pick.Explain to the class that they will have 10 minutes to research their creature and that they will need to work together as a team to complete the project. Each group will have to learn about what their specific creature needs. Explain that all creature need food, water, sun, shelter in their habitat to survive and it's their jobs to learn about these things and apply it to their life box. Set a 10 minute timer or keep an eye on the clock, give a 2 minute warning to encourage any last minute stragglers. The Lesson:Part 1: Applying knowledge through construction & teamworkOnce the kids know exactly what their creatures need to survive, they will begin construction of their life box. Using the folded cardstock paper or shoe box, the class will get artistic and draw things like food or plants. Encourage your class to cut our trees with construction or felt paper and glue things to the inside of their boxes. Remind the kids that every creature needs food, water, sun and shelter.The teacher will walk around the room encouraging creativity and ask the class if everyones creatures have all of their needs met to life in their life boxes. Part Two: DiscussionOnce everyone has finished up their life boxes and have fulfilled their creatures needs, we will begin learning about other groups habitats and give students the opportunity to teach others about theirs.Each group will get a chance to explain the needs of their creature with the rest of the classThe groups will then begin to learn about other creatures habitats and realize that living things are similar in ways because we all have basic needs for survival, but also a lot of differences in ways that all living things have special needs to survive.Encourage the class to ask questions and let the students answer them based on the research they've done.Ask questions that make the groups think more about their creatures. Why do armadillos have a shell and why do fish need gills? This will show the science of adaptability. Horse have 4 legs, while spiders have 8. What temperature do penguins need to be happy? The questions should all be STEM relevant so that the class is able to make the cross connections.Overview & End Of Lesson Reflecting:Ask students to iterate what they learned from this lesson. Did they learn any new information? Why is a habitat so important? How can we help make the planet a cleaner place so all of the creatures can live happily? What does pollution do to our environment?  What are ways we can help? What are some of the challenges their creature face?Tell the class to pay attention to the living things all around them. Now that they know how animals survive, they can do research in their own backyards! 

Editors may return to authors and peer reviewers their assessment of improvements in metadata, data access or reporting transparency that might improve the impact of the article by enabling reproducible research. In some cases, these improvements might need to be made as a precondition for peer review.This checklist incorporates community ideas for good research practice:https://www.cos.io/initiatives/top-guidelinesCitation StandardsAll data sets and code are cited in the text as ReferencesPersistent URI or DOI for data sets and codeCitation in Reference section contains author/title/year/URIData, Code, and Materials TransparencyAre the following present and sufficient to independently reproduce all claimed results?For reused public datasets: data URIs, program code, statistics scriptsFor new data and resourcesNew data available at a trusted digital repository OR all available in paperVariables, parameters, treatment conditions, and observation (number)Full procedures for collection, preprocessing, cleaning, or generating the dataCode, scripts, codebooks, algorithms (URI or all in paper)Research materials (description and source) and procedures necessary to conduct an independent replication of the research.Exceptions for ethical or legal restrictions to reproducible researchConditions on the dataset or materials that restrict researcher access and useAccess protocol for data or materialsAccess to software and other documentationIndicate all data and materials without the above constraintsResources available at a community-endorsed public repositoryAuthors request delay of access until publicationDo the editors identify any factors that might delay peer review/ delay acceptance for publication/ require editorial explanation upon publication /need expression of editorial concern / risk author might need to retract because of reproducibility concerns?Design and Analysis TransparencyAuthors declare reporting is in accordance with community standards listed on http://www.equator-network.org/ or https://fairsharing.orgEditors recommend the authors check the following community standards and report their results accordinglyReplicationSince we do not believe that even the best peer reviewed experimental design can overcome sources of variation among studies, the policy of the journal is to encourage submission of experimental designs that contain their own replication. We also encourage studies replicating or powered to replicate work published in this journal.Report contains both hypothesis generation and replication in separate studiesReport contains an unreplicated study

ABSTRACT I find series for constants whose Engel Expansions are equal to the integer sequences known as k-rough numbers. They appear to be expressed as a finite (but large) sum of hypergeometric functions for the general case.

A new representation of polynomials is investigated by defining the concept of summation Σ and product Π inverses. Then by defining an augmented matrix product it is found that two polynomials can be multiplied with their components retained in a resulting matrix. This is then shown to work for compositions of polynomials by using block matrices.

Relativization is a new approach to unification of general relativity with quantum theory. This involves treating the Einstein equivalence principle as a fundamental axiom of algebraic quantum field theory. Instead of quantization of gravity quantum field theory is recast in a form which makes it compatible with the principles of general relativity. Then using time honored techniques of quantum field theory, a unified model of the four known forces is derived. The model is computationally challenged and compared to well known observations of gravitational waves and the cosmic microwave background. It is found to agree with observation to a high degree. Agreement with observation being the strongest argument possible for any theoretical approach.

In the last years, populism has advanced in many consolidated as well as in young democracies. As highlighted by the latest Freedom House’s report, global freedom is experiencing an unprecedent stagnation. For the 13th consecutive year the countries who suffered a retreat outnumbered those who registered a democratic gain.Democratic partisans have proposed several strategies to face this issue, most of which are centred on the implementation of national reforms. However, international organizations could also contribute in several different ways to safeguard and democracy promotion in authoritarian countries as well as to improve it in consolidated democracies.Two interconnected democratic deficitsIt has become more common to talk about democratic deficit, but the term can be referred to two different situations. The first is about the fact that not all nations are democratic while the second acknowledges that global decisions are not taken democratically. Decisions about combatting climate change, controlling financial speculation and managing migration flows are not subject to democratic control or input from global citizens.These deficits are interconnected. An international organization with predominantly undemocratic member states will have trouble to democratize and national democratization is complicated if it takes place within an undemocratic global system.While democratic deficits remain a stark reality, we can also report good news: in the past sixty years, the quality and quantity of democracy has grown across the world. Unfortunately, the progress in the democratization of international organizations was limited, despite the fact that the scope and impact of global governance has increased.

For long time, political scientists have cultivated the idea that a country which succeeds in achieving a democratic transition, creates stable institutions, provides a robust civil society, and has achieved a certain level of wealth, has a rather low risk of an authoritarian backlash. In other words, a consolidated democratic society would create a sort of political “antibodies” able to impede the slide towards a totalitarian regime. This assumption was corroborated by the very impressive wave of democratization that took place since 1990 and, in fact, both the number and the quality of democratic regimes increased steadily. Such has been the progress of the new democracies that it suggested a sort of democratic triumphal march.Is this still true? How should we interpret the state of democracy in light of the electoral victories of Recep Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán and, above all, Donald Trump? For the first time over the last quarter of a century, it seems that democratic regimes are no longer consolidating and, above all, that this apparent reversal transpires through procedures of the secular democratic liturgy, namely free elections. Economic stagnation and increasing income inequality, the rise of unemployment and of poverty have generated discontent and xenophobia. And, as already happened in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, the word “democracy” has for many citizens become an empty box. Where they succeeded in gaining power, populist leaders did so through the mechanism of elections and were keen on presenting themselves as the authentic representatives of the people. Even when populists have not managed to acquire electoral majorities, as Beppe Grillo in Italy, Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France and Norbert Hofer in Austria, they pretend to be the genuine interpreters of the people’s wishes.Is there a risk that new elected leaders will substantially attack liberal institutions, as already happened in Europe in the inter-war period? So far, this has occurred in weak and relatively recent democracies such as Russia and Turkey, where governments have managed to attack and even imprison actual or potential opponents, limit the freedom of the press, and subdue the judicial power without losing much of their popular support.Can something similar also occur in consolidated democracies? Is there the possibility that new leaders with strong popular support will use their power to attack liberal infrastructures? Or, to phrase it differently, is there a danger that the power of the majority will be able to attack the rule of law and reduce civil, political and social liberties?Liberal systems are stable when there is a large majority of citizens that directly support democratic institutions as the only legitimate form of government \citep*{alfred1996}.  But, apparently, this is less true than it used to be. The prolonged economic stagnation faced by most Western democracies since 2007 had the adverse consequence that many material advantages provided by democracy have not been delivered. Income inequality, unemployment and poverty have increased while intergenerational mobility has decreased. It is therefore not surprising that so many citizens disappointed by what has not been delivered by traditional political parties are now supporting new forces. But can this often fully justified discontent undermine civil rights and democratic institutions? We are here wondering if the rule and the power of the people could work against the rule of law up to the point that liberal states would be transformed. It is always easy to unleash the worst attitude of the people against ethnic minorities, migrants, LGBTQ.Are the “new entrant” political factions just anti-establishment or more generally anti-democratic? New political leaders manage to acquire electoral support because they use aggressive language, denounce the wrongdoings of the incumbent politicians, and often call for scapegoats in weak and marginal social and ethnic groups. In optimistic scenarios, the new political forces become domesticated and after a while get accustomed to using parliamentary language and strategies; after having succeeded in harnessing the attention of the dissatisfied, they just become fresh contenders in the usual electoral race. But the pessimistic scenario is that they use their popular support to reduce liberties and modify the institutions that should guarantee democratic checks and balances.In Turkey, a country that for several years has struggled to consolidate its rather recent democratic structure, the government is re-writing the Constitution and there is a risk that this could be approved by popular referendum. In Russia, Putin is more than ever backed by its citizens. Brexit will also reduce the checks and balances provided by European institutions within British politics. And how the Trump administration will re-design civil and social rights, from abortion to immigrants’ entitlements, is still a mystery, even if the first signs are certainly not encouraging.Two ambitious scholars, \citet*{Foa_2016}, have provided some interesting and disconcerting data about citizens’ sentiments and perceptions toward democracy. Using data from the World Value Survey (1995-2014), the study shows that citizens in both North America and Western Europe became more critical toward democracy, and that an increased share of them no longer considered democracy as the only legitimate form of government. And to complicate the picture, it seems they began to look favourably upon non-democratic alternatives.

Political scientists have long believed that when a country succeeds in achieving a democratic transition, creating stable institutions and accomplishing a certain level of wealth, it has a rather low risk of an authoritarian backlash. There was the implicit assumption of a natural and irreversible path containing the following steps: 1) dictatorship, 2) dictablanda, 3) democradura, 4) democracy transition, 5) consolidated democracy. This assumption was valid for several decades and corroborated by the impressive wave of democratization that took place after 1990. In the last quarter of a century, in fact, both the number and the quality of democratic regimes has increased steadily, leading to what appeared to be a democratic triumphal march.But for the first time over the last quarter of a century, democratic regimes are no longer consolidating and, above all, this apparent reversal manifests itself in procedures that belong to the secular democratic liturgy, namely free elections. The outbreak of this populist infection within most western democracies challenges the idea that once consolidated democracies are immune to the possibility of experiencing a non-democratic reversal. The electoral successes of populist parties and leaders are a challenge for democratic practice and theory. Will the hypotheses regarding democratic consolidation still hold? And, most of all, what lies behind such a populist infection, and how it can be cured? Concerning the first two questions, the analysis of the data from the World Value Survey (1995-2014) carried out by two young scholars, \citet*{Foa_2016} provide some interesting and disconcerting data about citizens’ sentiments and perceptions toward democracy. The study shows that citizens within both North America and western Europe, have become more critical toward democracy, and that an increased proportion of them no longer consider democracy the only legitimate form of government. To generate further concerns, they began to look favourably upon non-democratic alternatives. According to this study, while older generations keep thinking that democracy is essential, younger generations are much more indifferent. In Europe, about 52% of citizens among the generation born in the 1930s believe that to live in a democratic country is fundamental, but only about 45% among those born in the 1980s share this opinion. In the United States, the intergenerational gap is even more heightened. 72% of citizens born in the 1930s believed democracy is essential, while only around 30% of those born in the 1980s had the same view.A similar pattern is visible regarding support for alternative, non-democratic forms of government, and in both the US and Europe, the percentage of citizens believing being ruled by the army is a “good” or a “very good” alternative steadily increases, especially among young, affluent citizens. A closer look at the original data confirms that in all countries there are still large majorities in favour of democracy. But while there are overwhelming democratic majorities, there is a strong disaffection with regard to democratic institutions, including political parties, parliamentarians and trade unions. The citizens that view a strong leader positively are still a minority, but they number more than in the past in the United States and in Spain, in Sweden and even in Germany. In both the US and Europe, the percentage of citizens believing being ruled by the army is a “good” or a “very good” alternative steadily increases, especially among young, affluent citizens.The same scholars, in a subsequent paper \citep*{Foa_2017} arrive at the claim that all these data could be a sign of the fallacy of the democratic assumption, and that they may also be a signal of a democratic deconsolidation within western democracies. Liberal systems are stable if a large majority of citizens directly support democratic institutions as the only legitimate form of government. But this is less true than it used to be. Is this disaffection undermining civil rights and democratic institutions? Is there a risk that newly elected leaders will substantially attack liberal institutions, as already happened in Europe in the inter-war period? So far, this has occurred only in weak and relatively recent democracies such as Russia and Turkey, where governments have managed to attack and even imprison actual or potential opponents, limit the freedom of the press, and subdue the judicial power without losing much of their popular support. Can something similar also occur in consolidated democracies? Is there the possibility that new leaders with strong popular support will use their power to attack liberal infrastructures, breaking the golden rule of respecting the election winner, and leading consolidated western democracies into non-democratic backlashes? Until now, these new political entrants have shown an anti-establishment rather than an anti-democratic sentiment. New political leaders have managed to acquire electoral support using aggressive language, denouncing mainly the wrongdoings of the incumbent politicians, and often calling for scapegoats in weak and marginal social and ethnic groups. But they have done it through democratic political institutions. Where they succeeded in gaining power, populist leaders did so through free and competitive elections, presenting themselves as the authentic representatives of the people. So, whether the signs highlighted by Foa and Mounk may or may not be a predictor of a possible non-democratic backlash, is far from being ascertained. We are facing two possible alternative scenarios, both plausible: in the optimistic one, the new political forces become domesticated and after a while get accustomed to using parliamentary language and strategies. Their language and policies aim to harness the attention of the dissatisfied, and they “mature” to become fresh contenders in the usual electoral race. But in the pessimistic one, they may use their popular support to reduce liberties and modify the institutions that should guarantee democratic checks and balances.Populist sentiments, more or less dormant, have always been present within western democracies as well as everywhere else in the world, and we may think they are deep feelings belonging to human nature. Can democratic politics manage to tame them? Until a few years ago, they affected only a minority of citizens. The fact that new political movements are managing, often rapidly, to increase their votes is generating a threatening race to the bottom. In all countries, established political parties have the dangerous propensity to counter this electoral wave of populism by adopting the issues and language used by them. It is a sort of infection and only a few politicians manage, at one and the same time, to resist the temptation and to be re-elected. For this reason, if it is not properly cured, the infection could end up permanently damaging the democratic system itself. The basic question we have to answer is therefore: why, over recent years, has the populist consensus so swiftly arisen? What is the basis of its success? Populist parties grew in most western democracies only after the end of the Cold War, most of them in the 1990s.To answer this question, it is useful to adopt a historical perspective. Populist parties grew in most western democracies only after the end of the Cold War, most of them in the 1990s. Despite some notable exceptions, their share of popular votes remained below ten percent for several decades. Looking at the electoral data (Figure 1), the picture then dramatically changes, and from 2007 populist parties began to gain traction consistently. Since 2007, populist party support has been growing in terms of both electoral votes and parliamentary seats.In the United States, the November 2016 electoral campaign demonstrated how two ‘outsiders’, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, tried to storm the two well-established political parties. One of them succeeded. In other countries with more pluralized and fractious political systems, such as Spain, Italy, Austria, France and Greece, the populist upsurge has coincided with the rise of new socially progressive movements. However, even in these cases populist parties have succeeded in gaining considerable electoral support. In Italy, the Movimento 5 Stelle gained 25.6 per cent of votes in 2013, being the party most voted for in what was its first parliamentary electoral race. In Greece, Syriza’s consensus moved from 4.6 percent in 2009 elections to 35.5 per cent in 2015. In Sweden, the Sverigedemokraterna (SD), a right-wing populist party, moved from 2.9 per cent of votes in 2006 to 12.9 per cent in 2014.The temporal evolution of the populists (Figure 1) indicates that the economic variable played an important role both in the affirmation and in the growth of populist parties’ consensus. In the first place, the consolidation of most populist parties in the 1990s coincided with a quite strong, even if not prolonged, economic stagnation starting in 1992/1993. In the second, their growth coincided with the prolonged economic crisis that began in 2008. In both cases, western countries experienced a steady drop in their growth rates and a significant economic stagnation (figure 2).

Gli scienziati politici hanno a lungo sostenuto che nel momento in cui un paese riesce a portare a termine una transizione democratica, creando istituzioni stabili e garantendo un certo livello di ricchezza, il rischio di una violenta reazione autoritaria sia piuttosto basso. L’assunzione implicita è la presenza di un percorso naturale e, se portato a termine, irreversibile composto dalle seguenti fasi: 1) dittatura, 2) dictablanda, 3) democradura \cite{Morlino_2009}, 4) transizione democrazia, 5) democrazia consolidata. Quest’assunzione è sembrata essere valida per diversi decenni, corroborata dall’impressionante ondata di democratizzazioni iniziata nel 1990. Nell’ultimo quarto di secolo, infatti, sia il numero che la qualità dei regimi democratici è aumentato costantemente, portando a quella che sembrava essere una marcia trionfale della democrazia.Per la prima volta nel corso dell’ultimo quarto di secolo, i regimi democratici sembrano oggi aver smesso di consolidarsi e questa apparente inversione traspare attraverso le procedure della liturgia democratica, cioè le libere elezioni. Lo scoppio dell’infezione populista, all’interno della maggior parte delle democrazie occidentali, sfida l’idea che le democrazie, una volta consolidate, siano immuni dalla possibilità di sperimentare un’inversione non democratica. I successi elettorali dei partiti e dei leader populisti rappresentano una sfida per la pratica e la teoria democratica. Le ipotesi sul consolidamento democratico possono ancora considerarsi valide? E soprattutto, quali sono le cause dell’infezione populista e come può essere curata?Per quanto riguarda la prima domanda, l’analisi dei dati del World Value Survey (1995-2014) realizzata da due giovani e ambiziosi studiosi,  \citet*{Foa_2016}, fornisce alcuni dati interessanti e allo stesso tempo sconcertanti circa i sentimenti e le percezioni dei cittadini verso la democrazia. Lo studio mostra che in Nord America e in Europa occidentale i cittadini sono diventati sempre più critici verso la democrazia e che una percentuale sempre maggiore non considera più la democrazia come l’unica forma di governo legittima. Ma soprattutto, aumenta la quota di coloro che iniziano a guardare con favore alle alternative non democratiche.Secondo lo studio, mentre le generazioni più anziane continuano a pensare che la democrazia sia essenziale, quelle più giovani sono diventate assai più indifferenti. In Europa, circa il 52% dei cittadini nati dal 1930 al 1939 ritiene che vivere in un paese democratico sia fondamentale, ma solo il 45% circa tra quelli nati dal 1980 al 1989 condivide questa opinione. Negli Stati Uniti, il divario intergenerazionale è ancora più accentuato, e il 72% dei cittadini nati dal 1930 al 1939 ritiene che la democrazia sia essenziale, mentre solo il 30% circa dei nati dal 1980 al 1989 ha mantenuto tale convinzione. Una simile evoluzione è visibile per quanto riguarda il sostegno a forme alternative di governo non democratico: sia negli Stati Uniti che in Europa la percentuale di cittadini che ritengono che essere governati dall’esercito sia un’alternativa “buona” o “molto buona” aumenta costantemente, soprattutto tra i cittadini giovani e ricchi. Uno sguardo più attento ai dati originali conferma che in tutti i paesi ci sono ancora ampie maggioranze a favore della democrazia. Ma mentre ci sono schiaccianti maggioranze democratiche, vi è anche una forte disaffezione per le istituzioni come i partiti politici, i parlamentari e i sindacati. I cittadini che vedono con favore l’eventuale avvento di un leader forte sono ancora una minoranza, ma i numeri sono molto più alti che in passato negli Stati Uniti e in Spagna, in Svezia e anche in Germania.Gli stessi studiosi, in un articolo successivo \citep*{1996} arrivano ad affermare che tutti questi dati potrebbero essere un segnale della fallacia delle assunzioni rispetto alla democrazia e che essi possono rappresentare persino un segnale di un deconsolidamento democratico all’interno delle democrazie occidentali. I sistemi liberali sono stabili se una grande maggioranza dei cittadini sostiene direttamente le istituzioni democratiche come unica forma legittima di governo, ma ciò sembra essere meno vero che in passato.È possibile che questa disaffezione possa minare le basi dei diritti civili e delle istituzioni democratiche? Esiste un rischio che i nuovi leader eletti corrodano sostanzialmente le istituzioni liberali, come già avvenuto in Europa nel periodo tra le due guerre? Finora, ciò è avvenuto solo nelle democrazie deboli e relativamente recenti, come nei casi della Russia e della Turchia, dove i governi sono riusciti a reprimere e addirittura imprigionare avversari reali o potenziali, limitare la libertà di stampa, e sottomettere il potere giudiziario, senza perdere molto del loro sostegno popolare. Può qualcosa di simile accadere anche nelle democrazie consolidate? C’è la possibilità che nuovi leader, con un forte sostegno popolare, usino il loro potere per attaccare le infrastrutture liberali, rompendo la regola d’oro del trionfo democratico, e portino le democrazie consolidate verso forme alternative di governo autoritario?Fino ad ora, i nuovi leader politici hanno mostrato un sentimento anti-establishment piuttosto che un sentimento anti-democratico. Questi nuovi leader politici sono riusciti ad acquisire consenso elettorale usando un linguaggio aggressivo, soprattutto denunciando le malefatte dei politici in carica, e spesso trovando dei capri espiatori nei gruppi sociali ed etnici più deboli e marginali, ma lo hanno fatto attraverso le istituzioni politiche democratiche. Laddove sono riusciti a guadagnare potere, i leader populisti lo hanno fatto attraverso le elezioni libere, ricorrenti e competitive, presentandosi come i veri e autentici rappresentanti della popolazione. Quindi, la possibilità che i segnali evidenziati da Foa e Mounk possano o meno essere considerati un fattore predittivo di una possibile reazione non democratica, è ben lungi dall’essere accertata.Tuttavia, siamo di fronte a due possibili scenari alternativi, entrambi plausibili: in quello ottimista, le nuove forze politiche diventeranno addomesticate e dopo un po’ si abitueranno ad usare il linguaggio e le strategie parlamentari. Il loro linguaggio e le politiche miranti a sfruttare l’attenzione dei cittadini insoddisfatti matureranno, ed essi diventeranno nuovi contendenti nella consueta competizione elettorale. E’ quello che è successo in Italia con la Lega Nord e in Francia con il Front National. Ma nello scenario pessimistico, essi potrebbero utilizzare il loro sostegno popolare per ridurre le libertà e modificare le istituzioni che dovrebbero garantire i controlli e i contrappesi democratici.I sentimenti populisti, più o meno dormienti, sono sempre stati presenti all’interno delle democrazie occidentali, tanto quanto in tutto il resto del mondo, tanto che si potrebbe arrivare a supporre che essi siano sentimenti profondi appartenenti alla stessa natura umana. Può la democrazia riuscire a domarli? Fino a pochi anni fa, tali sentimenti sembravano riguardare solo una minoranza dei cittadini, ma il fatto che i nuovi movimenti politici riescano ad aumentare i loro voti, spesso in maniera alquanto rapida, sta generando una minacciosa corsa al ribasso. In tutti i paesi, i partiti politici tradizionali mostrano una pericolosa propensione a cercare di contrastare i successi elettorali del populismo discutendo le loro stesse questioni e utilizzando lo stesso linguaggio e la stessa retorica. Si tratta di una sorta di infezione e solo pochi politici riescono a resistere alla tentazione di seguire il popolo nei suoi istinti peggiori e, allo stesso tempo, ad essere rieletti. Per questo motivo, se non adeguatamente curata, l’infezione potrebbe finire per danneggiare in modo permanente il sistema democratico stesso.La domanda di fondo a cui dobbiamo rispondere è dunque: perché, negli ultimi anni, il consenso populista è cresciuta così tanto? E qual è la base del suo successo?Per rispondere a questa domanda, è utile adottare una prospettiva storica. I partiti populisti sono cresciuti nella maggior parte delle democrazie occidentali solo dopo la fine della guerra fredda, e la maggior parte di essi nel corso degli ultimi vent’anni. Nonostante alcune eccezioni, la loro percentuale di voti è rimasta al di sotto del dieci per cento per diversi decenni. Guardando i dati elettorali (Figura 1), il quadro cambia radicalmente, e dal 2007 i partiti populisti cominciano a guadagnare terreno. Dal 2007, il supporto ai partiti populisti è cresciuto sia in termine di voti che in termine di seggi parlamentari.Negli Stati Uniti, la campagna elettorale conclusasi lo scorso novembre 2016 ha dimostrato come due “outsiders”, Donald Trump e Bernie Sanders, hanno cercato di prendere d’assalto i due partiti politici tradizionali, quello Democratico e quello Repubblicano. E uno di loro è riuscito nell’impresa. In altri paesi con sistemi politici più pluralistici e polarizzati, come la Spagna, l’Italia, l’Austria, la Francia e la Grecia, la recrudescenza populista ha coinciso con l’ascesa di nuovi movimenti sociali progressisti. Tuttavia, anche in questi casi i partiti populisti sono riusciti ad ottenere un notevole consenso elettorale. In Italia, il Movimento 5 Stelle ha ottenuto il 25,6 per cento dei voti nel 2013, risultando il partito più votato in quella che era la sua prima competizione elettorale parlamentare. In Grecia, il consenso di Syriza è aumentato dal 4,6 per cento nelle elezioni del 2009 al 35,5 per cento in quelle del 2015. In Svezia, il Sverigedemokraterna (SD), un partito populista di destra, è passato dal 2.9 per cento nel 2006 al 12.9 per cento nel 2014.L’evoluzione temporale del populismo (figura 1) sembra indicare che la variabile economica ha giocato un ruolo importante sia nell’affermazione, che nella crescita del consenso dei partiti populisti. Da un lato, l’affermazione della maggior parte dei partiti populisti nel 1990 ha coinciso con una stagnazione economica, molto accentuata anche se non prolungata nel tempo, iniziata nel 1992/1993. D’altra parte, la loro crescita ha coinciso con la prolungata crisi economica scoppiata nel 2008. In entrambi i casi, i paesi occidentali hanno sperimentato un calo consistente dei tassi di crescita e un’importante stagnazione economica (figura 2).

In the 1920s José Ortega y Gasset, an educated and conservative Spanish thinker, observed with increasing concern that liberal regimes, in spite of the fact that they extended suffrage and increased political and social rights, were losing control over their political systems and that the masses were inclined to support extremist political forces \citep{j1929}. The populist upsurge we have witnessed in the last years could be the symptom, to use Ortega’s term, of a new revolt of the masses. The rebellion is directed not so much towards the very essence of the democratic form of government, but rather towards those elites that have failed to share advantages with the people.